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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

RANDALL D. TUCKER,

t

Case No. 890423-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), as the appeal is from a
district court in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a
first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court correctly allowed

impeachment of defendant by use of a prior conviction and
evidence of other crimes, and whether the trial court properly
denied defendant's motion for mistrial based on this impeachment.
The standard of review for a court's ruling on evidentiary issues
is whether the court so abused its discretion that there is a
likelihood that injustice resulted.
1032, 1035 (Utah 1987).

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 31, 1989, defendant was charged, along with a
codefendant, with two counts of burglary, both third degree
felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), and
one count of theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 9-10).
After preliminary hearing, one count of burglary against
defendant, alleged to have occurred on or about March 27, 1989,
was dismissed (R. at 3 and 9).
On May 17, 1989, the day trial began, the codefendant
pled guilty to one count of burglary (R. at 45-51 and 54).
Defendant was tried by jury on one count of burglary and one
count of theft on May 17-18, 1989, in the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy,
district judge, presiding (R. at 52-53 and 65-66).

On the first

day of trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the
State from presenting evidence of defendant's prior felony
convictions for failure to comply with an officer's signal to
stop, committed in 1981, and attempted forgery, committed in
1988.

The motion was made pursuant to rules 609, 403, and

404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (R. at 55-56).
A hearing on the motion in limine was conducted at
trial, outside of the presence of the jury, after opening
statements were given by counsel (R. at 52, 124 at 66, and 123 at
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2-15).

The motion was denied, with the court placing its

findings on the record (R. at 52 and 123 at 11-15).

During

trial, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, claiming that the
prosecution had exceeded the proper scope in questioning
defendant about his prior conviction.

The trial court denied the

motion, finding that defendant had opened the door for such
extensive cross-examination by his own testimony (R. 125 at 4047).
The jury acquitted defendant of burglary and convicted
him of theft (R. at 65-66).

On June 5, 1989, Judge Murphy

sentenced defendant to a term not to exceed five years in the
Utah State Prison and a fine.

The sentence was stayed and

defendant placed on probation for thirty-six months with
specified terms and conditions (R. at 106-107).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 29, 1989, 90-year old Harvey D. Hansen drove
to 1186 South Redwood Road.

Mr. Hansen had owned that property

for many years and had used the dwelling there as an office (R.
123 at 16-17).

Next to the dwelling was a storage shed which was

kept locked, and which contained personal property belonging to
Mr. Hansen's son (R. 123 at 17-18).
As Mr. Hansen pulled into the driveway on the property
at approximately noon that day, he saw a car parked at the back
of the buildings (R. 123 at 17).

The trunk of the car was open,

and Mr. Hansen saw items in the trunk and in the passenger area
of the car which had been stored in the shed (R. 123 at 18-19).
Defendant was standing in front of the car and Mr. Hansen asked
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him what was going on (R. 123 at 20-21).

Defendant did not

respond and Mr. Hansen walked back to his own car.

Mr. Hansen

took down the license plate number of the suspect car (R. 123 at
21-22).

As he was writing down the number, the codefendant came

from behind the shed, got into the car along with defendant,
backed around Mr. Hansen's car and drove away on Redwood Road (R.
123 at 22) .
After they left, Mr. Hansen telephoned the police and
gave dispatch the license number and a description of the car (R.
123 at 23). A short time later, the police called Mr. Hansen to
tell him that they had located the car (R. 123 at 23). Officers
picked up Mr. Hansen and took him to a trailer park three to four
blocks from the Hansen property (R. 123 at 26-27 and 79). There
Mr. Hansen identified the car, items in the car as those taken
from the shed, and defendant (R. 123 at 27-29 and 79-81).

No one

had been given permission to be in the shed or take the property
(R. 123 at 44).
When an officer had first approached the trailer at
which the car was parked, the codefendant answered the door (R.
125 at 4).

In response to the officer's question, the

codefendant said that "Randy Tucker" had been with him when he
was at the shed (R. 125 at 5). Pursuant to consent, officers
searched the trailer house and found defendant hiding under a bed
(R. 125 at 6).
At trial, defendant testified that he had been with the
codefendant that day to work on the codefendant's car and the
codefendant had been taking defendant home (R. 125 at 16-17).
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Defendant said that the codefendant stopped at the Hansen
property to pick up some items (R. 125 at 17). When Mr. Hansen
arrived, defendant became suspicious about the codefendant's
presence there and read off the license plate number of the
codefendant's car to Mr. Hansen (R. 125 at 20 and 30-32).

When

the two defendants left, Mr. Hansen directed them in getting
their car out of the driveway (R. 125 at 21 and 32). Defendant
said that there was no personal property in the car when he and
the codefendant drove from the Hansen property to the trailer
house (R. 123 at 20-22 and 30-31).

According to defendant, on

the way to the trailer house the codefendant said that he wanted
to return the personal property he had taken earlier.

The

codefendant hauled it out of the trailer house and was putting it
into the car when the police arrived (R. 125 at 22). Defendant
said that he had never seen the stolen items until the police
officers took them out of the codefendant's trailer (R. 125 at
24).
On direct examination by his counsel, defendant
testified that he had previously been convicted of attempted
forgery.

Defendant then explained his version of the

circumstances surrounding that conviction (R. 125 at 24-25; the
text of defendant's testimony regarding this conviction is
attached as Addendum A ) .
On rebuttal, the codefendant testified that defendant
had helped him move the property from inside the shed to the
outside and had driven the car away from the Hansen property (R.
125 at 67 and 71-73).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence that
defendant had a prior conviction for attempted forgery was
properly admitted.

Cross-examination about the details of that

conviction normally would have been improper; however, defendant
opened the door for such cross-examination.

On direct

examination, defendant attempted to minimize his guilt for the
previous offense, and the prosecution then was allowed to impeach
defendant with details he had previously given about the prior
conviction.
A separate but related issue was the introduction of
evidence of prior illicit drug use on the part of defendant.
While he had not been convicted of a crime based on this
evidence, he was properly cross-examined about it.

The cross-

examination was appropriate because, again, defendant opened the
door to the questioning by his own testimony on direct
examination.
Further, defendant has waived any right to challenge
the prosecution's cross-examination about the details of his
prior conviction by failing to object to the questioning at
trial.

Defendant only objected to the introduction of the

evidence of illicit drug use, a matter which was not charged and
of which he had no prior conviction.
Defendant's arguments are based on rules 403 and 404,
Utah Rules of Evidence.

When analyzed, it becomes clear that

these provisions, because of their generality and rule 404's
specific applicability to character evidence, are not as
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applicable to this argument as are the specific provisions of
rules 608 and 609.

The latter rules specifically apply to

impeachment testimony and thus supercede use of more general
rules in that area of evidence.

The evidence of defendant's

other crimes or wrongs was admissible as pure impeachment; it was
not offered or admitted as character evidence.
Even if the evidence of a prior conviction and other
crimes had been improperly admitted, their admission was harmless
error at most.

The trial court admonished and instructed the

jury that such evidence was only to be used for impeachment
purposes.

In addition, other evidence produced at trial,

untainted by the challenged evidence of conviction or of other
crimes, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

There is

no likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant if the
challenged evidence were excluded.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR A CRIME
INVOLVING DISHONESTY AND EVIDENCE OF OTHER
CRIMES BY DEFENDANT.
It is unclear what defendant is specifically arguing as
grounds for appeal.

There appears to be a general challenge that

the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss because,
he alleges, the prosecution went beyond permissible bounds in
cross-examining him regarding the details of his previous
conviction.

Included in that argument is a challenge that the

prosecution impermissibly questioned defendant regarding prior
crimes or wrongs which did not result in a conviction.
-7-

While

these two claims are interrelated, they are not the same claim
and are treated under different rules of evidence.

This brief

will address the two claims separately.
A.

Waiver.

In order to address either issue, it is important to
first determine whether both issues have been preserved for
appeal.

It is clearly established that:
[a] general rule of appellate review in
criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such
claim on appeal.

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987) (footnote
omitted).

Thus, a defendant has waived the right to object to

the admission of evidence if he or she did not raise a timely
objection to admission at trial.
Defendant testified on direct examination by his
counsel that he had been convicted of attempted forgery.

When

the prosecutor cross-examined him about that conviction,
defendant did not object to questioning about the details of the
crime itself (R. 125 at 25-27; Addendum A).

It was not until the

prosecutor asked defendant about his stated purpose for cashing
the checks, i.e., to support a drug habit, that defense counsel
raised an objection.

There was a sidebar conference and the

objection was overruled (R. 125 at 27; Addendum A ) .
Shortly thereafter, the defense rested and defendant
moved for a mistrial on the basis of the prosecution's crossexamination (R. 125 at 40; Addendum A).
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That motion was tied to

the objection which had been discussed in the unreported sidebar
conference (R. 125 at 41; Addendum A).

The objection and the

motion both were limited to the prosecution's elicitation of
evidence of other crimes or wrongs, i.e., illicit drug use (R.
125 at 40-41).

No argument was made regarding the prosecution

eliciting additional details about the prior conviction itself,
such as the number of checks and amount of money taken.

The

objection only dealt with the questions regarding the purpose
defendant had given for committing the forgeries.

Since an

objection was not raised to the other details of the prior
conviction, defendant is now precluded from challenging on appeal
the introduction of those other details.
B.

Analysis Under Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Even if this Court decides to reach the merits of the
issues raised by defendant, his claims are without merit.
Defendant's general contention is that the trial court improperly
allowed the prosecution to cross examine defendant regarding
details of his prior conviction for attempted forgery.

Defendant

concedes that the case of State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 529 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) held that forgery is a crime of dishonesty or false
statement and is therefore admissible under rule 609(a)(2), Utah
Rules of Evidence (Brief of Appellant at 11).

However, defendant

complains that the court allowed the prosecution to extend
questioning beyond permissible limits.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that:
[T]his Court will not reverse the trial
court's ruling on evidentiary issues unless
it is manifest that the court so abused its
discretion that there is a likelihood that
injustice resulted.
-9-

State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987) (citations
omitted).

In a situation more specific to the issue of exclusion

of evidence of prior convictions, the Court has said:
The standard for reversal in cases
involving an erroneous failure to exclude
prior convictions is whether absent the
error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for the defendant.
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989) (citations
omitted).

The standard, then, is whether the trial court abused

its discretion by allowing evidence of a prior conviction to
reach the jury, and whether the error in admitting that evidence,
if any, prejudiced defendant.
In explaining the predecessor to rule 609, Utah Rules
of Evidence, the Utah Supreme Court stated the general rule
regarding questioning a defendant about prior convictions.
Court said:
Also assigned as error is the crossexamination of the defendant as to prior
convictions. It was elicited upon crossexamination that the defendant had several
prior felony convictions, unrelated to the
instant charge, and he maintains that this
amounted to a general assault upon his
character and thus constituted prejudicial
error. This is also without merit. When an
accused voluntarily takes the witness stand
he may be asked whether or not he has ever
been convicted of a felony. Such a question
is sanctioned by statute. If the accused
answers in the affirmative, he may be asked
the nature of the felony. Further, the
accused may be asked if he has been convicted
of more than one felony, and if so, the type
or nature thereof.

However, the details or circumstances
surrounding the felony or felonies for which
the accused was convicted may not be inquired
into except under unusual circumstances[.]
-10-

The

State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407, 409 (1963)
(footnotes omitted).

This statement of the law has not changed

substantially since the adoption of the Utah Rules of Evidence in
1983.
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides the means by
which the credibility of a witness, including a defendant, may be
attacked.

The pertinent portion of the rule reads:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime . . . (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.

The premise behind this rule is that crimes which "were committed
by fraudulent or deceitful means bear[] directly on the accused's
likelihood to testify truthfully."

State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646,

656 (Utah 1989) .
This rule, based verbatim on the corresponding federal
rule of evidence, raises:
a problem in reconciling two potentially
conflicting rules of evidence. Thus, on the
one hand, a jury cannot properly infer from
evidence of prior criminal convictions that
the accused is a bad man, who, with a proven
propensity to commit crimes, probably
committed the crime in question. . . . Yet,
on the other hand, the credibility of a
defendant, like that of any other witness, is
subject to impeachment through evidence of
his prior convictions.
United States v. Tumblin, 551 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir. 1977).
Because of this conflict, the Utah Supreme Court has decreed
that:
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[w]hen impeaching a defendant, or any other
witness, by conviction of a prior felony, it
is permissible to inquire only into the fact
and nature of the prior conviction, but not,
except in unusual circumstances, the
surrounding details or circumstances.
State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1982).
This general rule has an exception which has been
expounded in federal case law.

This Court, in State v. Ross, 782

P.2d 529 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), explained the position of federal
case law in interpreting rule 609:
The Utah Supreme Court noted that "Utah's
Rule 609 is the federal rule verbatim," and
advised that "federal case law should be
consulted for advice in interpreting the
rule."
782 P.2d at 530 (quoting State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988)).

Regarding questioning about the details of a

prior conviction, federal case law provides that:
[o]rdinarily, it is improper for the
prosecution to examine into the details of
the crime for which the accused was
convicted. The cross-examination should be
confined to a showing of the essential facts
of convictions, the nature of the crimes, and
the punishment. Care should be taken to
protect the accused as far as possible from
being convicted because of past conduct and
not the crime for which he is being tried. .
. . A different situation is presented when
an accused, on direct examination, attempts
to explain away the effect of the conviction
or to minimize his guilt. In such cases the
defendant may be cross-examined on any facts
which are relevant to the direct examination.
• . . "[H]e has no right to set forth to the
jury all the facts which tend in his favor
without laying himself open to a crossexamination upon those facts."
United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977)
(quoting Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900)).
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See also United States v, Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir.
1987) ("when a witness 'opens the door' by denial of guilt of the
prior conviction, a more detailed cross-examination is
permissible.")
In the present case, defendant opened the door for the
prosecution to question him about the details of his prior
conviction.

The trial court had already determined that evidence

of the fact of the attempted forgery conviction was admissible.
Defendant then chose to testify and to allow himself to be crossexamined about his testimony and about "matters affecting the
credibility of the [defendant]."

Utah R. Evid. 611(b).

As a

trial tactic, defendant chose to testify about his prior
conviction on direct examination by his own counsel. However,
defendant did not limit his testimony to the mere fact of his
previous conviction; he chose, instead, to testify about the
"circumstances surrounding that offense and [his] ultimate
conviction[.]"

(R. 125 at 25; Addendum A).

He attempted to

minimize his guilt in the previous case, testifying that it was
his own money in his sister's bank account and that he had forged
his sister's name to a check to get his own money.

He said that

the money involved was less than $100.00. He also testified that
he needed the money to move into his own house (R. 125 at 25;
Addendum A ) .

The prosecution was then permitted to discredit

that testimony by showing that the facts previously admitted by
defendant when pleading guilty to the attempted forgery did not
match the testimony he was then giving.

Defendant, on cross-

examination, admitted that he had taken five checks from his
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mother and forged her name to some of them.

He also admitted

that the amount involved was in excess of $600.00 (R. 125 at 2526).

On cross-examination, defendant denied that he had cashed

the checks to support a drug habit.

It was at this juncture that

defense counsel interposed an objectionf which was overruled
after a sidebar conference (R. 125 at 27). The prosecution was
then entitled to challenge defendant's credibility using a
statement which defendant had filled out in conjunction with the
earlier conviction.

In this statement, defendant had indicated

that he had forged the checks to support a drug habit (R. 125 at
28).

When confronted with this information, defendant said that

he did not remember whether he had made such a statement.

The

prosecution then impeached defendant's credibility by questioning
him about his prior drug use to demonstrate that defendant had
been untruthful in his trial testimony regarding the purpose for
the money obtained in the forgeries (R. 125 at 28).
Given defendant's attempts to minimize his guilt in the
earlier case and his trial testimony, which was clearly
contradictory to the facts of the earlier case, the questioning
by the prosecutor was proper impeachment of defendant.

The

details elicited on cross-examination demonstrated the
untruthfulness of defendant's testimony on direct examination.
From this information, the jury was allowed to judge the
credibility of defendant in his testimony about the current
charges.
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C.

The Applicability of Rules 403, 404 and 608, Utah
Rules of Evidence.

Defendant argues that the trial court was required to
make a determination under rules 403 and 404, Utah Rules of
Evidence, regarding the probative versus prejudicial impact of
evidence of his prior conviction.
above for this proposition.

He cites the Wolf case noted

It is at this juncture in his

argument that defendant blurs the distinction between admission
of evidence of prior convictions under rule 609(a) and admission
of evidence of specific instances of conduct for the purpose of
impeachment.

Defendant lumps them all under evidence of prior

convictions and argues rule 609 only.
The applicability of rules 403 and 404 in rule 609(a)
arguments is dependent upon which subsection of rule 609(a) is
relied on in the case.

In State v. Ross, 782 P.2d 528, this

Court borrowed from federal case law in analyzing the interplay
of rules 403 and 609(a):
[W]e look to federal case law and find that
"[e]vidence of a conviction of forgery, which
is a crime involving dishonesty and false
statement, is mandatorily admissible for
impeachment purposes" under Rule 609(a).

Clearly, under Utah law, the crime of
attempted forgery involves the same
culpability and dishonesty as does the crime
of forgery itself. Therefore, attempted
forgery is automatically admissible under
Rule 609(a)(2), and the trial court ruled
correctly in admitting the evidence of
defendant's prior conviction.
782 P.2d at 530-31 (quoting United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314,
1317 (9th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis added).
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Ross next argued that

rule 403 precluded admission of his prior conviction even if rule
609 did not.

Because rule 403 is verbatim to the federal rule,

this Court again looked to federal law to resolve this claim.
This Court said:
The federal courts that have ruled on Rules
609 and 403 in tandem have held that the
trial court has no discretion to exclude
prior crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement.
In United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349
(1st Cir. 1981), the First Circuit stated,
"We are driven by the force of explicit
statutory language and legislative history to
hold that evidence offered under Rule
609(a)(2) is not subject to the general
balancing provision of Rule 403." Ici. at
354. The Kiendra court pointed out that Rule
403 is permissive, while Rule 609 is
mandatory: "Rule 403 provides, 'Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded' . . .
Rule 609(a) provides, 'evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted. '" JEd. (emphasis added) .
Therefore, we hold that where Rule 609 is
applicable, its mandatory language supercedes
[sic] the permissive language of Rule 403.
Kiendra also distinguished between the
general provisions of Rule 403 and the
specific provisions of Rule 609: "Rule 403
is a general provision intended to govern a
wide landscape of evidentiary concerns; Rule
609 is a narrow provision intended to
regulate the impeachment of witnesses who
have been convicted of prior crimes." Ici. at
354. The court found that the drafters of
Rule 403 did not expect it to "prevail over
more specific rules; it was 'designed as a
guide for the handling of situations for
which no specific rules have been
formulated.'" Ici. Fed.R.Evid. 403 advisory
committee's note.

In pertinent part, rule 403 reads:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice[.]
-16-

782 P.2d at 531 (footnote omitted).

This Court concluded that

evidence of a previous conviction for a crime involving
dishonesty or false statement (specifically, attempted forgery)
was properly admissible without a rule 403 balancing.

Id.

This same analysis would seem to apply to rule 404.

2

Rule 404 deals generally with character evidence, "offered for
substantive purposes rather than for impeachment[.]"

Boyce and

Kimball, Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1 Utah L. Rev. 81 (1985).
That general rule is expressly limited by the provisions of rules
607, 608, and 609 in the area of impeachment.

Utah R. Evid.

404(a)(3).3
4
Defendant argues that the provisions of rule 404(b) ,
Rule 404(b) reads, in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith.
That subsection reads:
(a) Character evidence generally.
Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in
conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:

(3) Character of witness. Evidence of
the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
This subsection reads:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
-17-

Utah Rules of Evidence, precluded admission of evidence of his
prior drug use and employment history.

Rule 404 is not

applicable to the present case because the evidence defendant
complains of was not offered or admitted for the purpose of
proving defendant's character "in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith."

Utah R. Evid. 404(b).

A reading of

defendant's testimony clearly shows that the prosecutor's
questions were a means of pure impeachment, not an attack on
defendant's character.
In State v. Johnson, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah Aug.
17, 1989), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of:
whether the introduction of evidence of prior
inconsistent statements constitutes an attack
on truthfulness so as to allow the
introduction of evidence of truthful
character.
115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10.

In Johnson, the defendant had

challenged the officer-victim's recollection of the crime by
introducing prior statements by the officer which were
inconsistent with the officer's testimony at trial.

The State

claimed that that amounted to an attack on the officer's
character and sought to admit evidence under rule 608(a) about
the officer's character for truthfulness.

The Supreme Court

said:
While we agree that an attack on a witness's
memory may be an attack on his or her
credibility, it is not an attack on "the
character of the witness for truthfulness."
In short, an attack on one's memory is not
the same as an attack on one's character.
4
Cont. plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
-18-

Id.

In an accompanying footnote, the Court stated:
While we agree that "'[a] basic rule of
evidence provides that prior inconsistent
statements may be used to impeach the
credibility of a witness,'" . . . we are not
of the view that every attack on credibility
is an attack on character.

115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14 n. 33 (citations omitted).
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court allowed
impeachment evidence even though that evidence was also evidence
of a prior bad act.

In State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979),

the Supreme Court said:
We agree with, and reaffirm, the general
principle advanced by the defendant that
evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible
for the purpose of disgracing the defendant
or showing a propensity to commit crime. . .
However, the record before us shows that
the evidence was introduced, not for either
one of these purposes, but to impeach the
defendant's credibility in testifying that he
had not previously pointed a weapon at Dirks.
It is a well-settled rule that when a
defendant testifies in his defense, he is
subject to being impeached. State v. Green,
Utah 578 P.2d 512, 513 (1978), stated:
This includes cross-examination on any
matter which would tend to contradict,
explain or cast doubt upon the credibility
of his testimony. Furthermore, any
testimony or evidence which is purposed to
those same objectives may be introduced in
rebuttal.
Since the evidence was introduced to
impeach the defendant's credibility, it was
admissible for that limited purpose even
though it was also evidence of a prior bad
act.
603 P.2d at 812 (citation omitted).
When a defendant opens the door about previous crimes
or wrongs, he can then be cross-examined on those acts.
Utah Supreme Court said:
-19-

As the

if the defendant himself opens up the subject
as to prior incidents, it becomes subject to
cross-examination and refutation the same as
any other evidence.
State v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1981) (footnote omitted).
In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the United States
Supreme Court said:
Every criminal defendant is privileged to
testify in his own defense, or to refuse to
do so. But that privilege cannot be
construed to include the right to commit
perjury. . . . Having voluntarily taken the
stand, [defendant] was under an obligation to
speak truthfully and accurately, and the
prosecution [may] utilize the traditional
truth-testing devices of the adversary
process [against defendant].
401 U.S. at 225 (citations omitted).
In the present case, defendant makes a general claim
that cross-examination about the details of his prior conviction
violated rule 404(b).

That rule is not applicable to evidence

about his previous conviction for forgery which was clearly
mandatorily admissible under rule 609(a)(2) as a crime involving
dishonesty or false statement, as was argued in the previous
subpoint.

The details elicited, however, did raise allegations

of illicit drug use, a crime of which defendant was not
convicted.

If this information had been elicited solely to

demonstrate defendant's propensity toward crime, its use would
have been improper.

However, a review of defendant's testimony

clearly shows that the information about drug use was elicited
solely to challenge defendant's credibility.
Defendant's testimony on direct examination by his own
counsel was that the money he received from forging checks was

-20-

his own money.

He said that he "needed [his] money cause [sic]

[he] was moving out of the house. And in order to get another
house [he] needed [his] money."

(R. 125 at 25; Addendum A).

The

prosecutor properly challenged defendant's credibility by asking
him about a statement which defendant had made when he pled
guilty to the attempted forgery.

The prosecutor asked if

defendant hadf on the earlier occasion, said that he took the
money to support a drug habit.

When defendant testified that he

could not remember whether he had made that statement, the
prosecutor questioned him about drug use during that period.

(R.

125 at 28). This was proper impeachment because defendant's
testimony at trial concerning his use for the money was directly
contradictory to his previous statement that he had taken the
money to support a drug habit.
After defendant responded that he did not remember
whether he had made the prior statement that he had obtained the
money to support a drug habit, the prosecutor asked further
impeachment questions.

To test defendant's credibility about not

remembering the drug habit statement, the prosecutor asked if
defendant was on drugs when he committed the earlier forgery.
The testimony went as follows:
Q (by Mr. Jones) Were you on cocaine in
April of 1988?
A (by defendant) Had I used cocaine?
Q Yes.
A A few times, yes.
Q Did you have a drug problem?
A Not really a problem.
Q Well, have you entered or been ordered
to go into a drug rehabilitation program?
A I completed it, yes.
Q Did you complete the program?
A Yes.
-21-

Q And when was that?
A I was ordered in, I think, June of
1988, to go.
Q Was it your testimony that you didn't
have a drug problem at the time you entered
that plea?
A No, I entered a plea of guilty.
Q Excuse me, in April of 1988—
A Yes, sir.
Q —you had a drug problem at that time?
A

It was going to become a problem, yes.

(R. 125 at 28; Addendum A ) .

This questioning was clearly for the

purpose of demonstrating defendant's credibility about lack of
recollection he had claimed at first.
The final claim, that defendant was improperly
questioned about his unemployment, was not preserved for appeal.
The one question asked by the prosecution was, "You were
unemployed at the time of this incident?1' Defendant replied,
"Yes."

(R. 125 at 29). No objection was interposed to this

question, nor was a motion to strike the answer sought.
The trial court properly allowed the cross-examination
of defendant which challenged the truthfulness of the testimony
defendant was giving at trial.

The court also properly cautioned

the jury as to use they could make of the testimony regarding the
forgery (R. 125 at 34; Addendum A).

The court also gave the jury

a cautionary instruction regarding the use of the impeachment
testimony (R. at 79; a copy of this instruction is attached as
Addendum B).

It is presumed that the jury followed this

instruction when it deliberated on this case.

As the Utah

Supreme Court said:
We also gave credit to the intelligence of
the jury when we said in State v. Hodges, 30
Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1322 (1974):

-22-

In the absence of the appearance of
something persuasive to the contrary, we
assume that the jurors were conscientious
in performing their duty, and that they
followed the instructions of the court.
State v. Gardunio, 652 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah 1982).
In the present case, the court's cautionary
admonishment and instruction limited the use of defendant's
testimony about other crimes to impeachment.

The evidence was

not used to attack defendant's character in general, or to
establish that he had a propensity toward criminal activity; the
evidence was used to show that defendant was being untruthful
when he testified.

Since the evidence of defendant's prior

statements about drug use were for the limited purpose of
impeaching his credibility, the trial court was correct in
denying defendant's motion for mistrial on that basis.
D.

Even If Admission of This Evidence Was Improper,
Such Error Was Harmless.

Even if an appellate court determines that crossexamination of a defendant about prior convictions and other
crimes was improper, such a finding does not signal automatic
reversal of the present conviction.

If "the error had no

prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case", reversal is not
warranted.

State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1982).

the Williams case, the Court found that cross-examination about
the details of the prior conviction was improper.

However, the

conviction was affirmed because:
[defendant's guilt was shown by
overwhelming, untainted evidence, and there

-23-

In

is no likelihood that there would have been a
different result in absence of the error.
Id.
If this Court were to find that the trial court erred
in denying defendant's motion for mistrial on the basis of
improper impeachment, such error was harmless.

The standard for

reversal is whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for defendant if the erroneously admitted
evidence were excluded.
1989).

State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah

Such a likelihood does not exist in the present case.

The evidence presented at trial was that defendant was standing
next to, and then departed in, a vehicle which was at the scene
of a burglary and theft (R. 123 at 21-22).

One of the victims of

the burglary saw, in the car, items of personal property which
had been in the shed (R. 123 at 18).

Those items were later

found in the car by police at a trailer house three to four
blocks from the burglary (R. 123 at 28-29 and 79). The
codefendant testified that defendant had helped him take the
items and put them in the car (R. 125 at 67). The fact that
defendant testified that the property was not in the car until
after he and the codefendant returned to the trailer house
underscores the credibility aspect of this case.

It was the

jury's obligation to judge the credibility of the witnesses and
to reconcile the contradictory evidence:
The fact that there was contradictory
testimony, without more, is not grounds for
reversal, State v. Watts, Utah 675 P.2d 566,
568 (1983). The conflicting evidence was
before the jury, and it was the jury's
responsibility to evaluate its significance.
State v. Wulffenstein, Utah, 657 P.2d 289,
-24-

292 (1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 . . .
(1983).
State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985) (additional
citations omitted).

The jury properly performed its function and

determined that defendant was guilty of theft.

There was ample

independent evidence, untainted by the impeachment questions, to
support the jury's verdict; there is no likelihood that there
would have been a different result without the impeachment
evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

1

shed or shop?

2

A

No.

-

Q

Did you at any time ever have in your possession

4

or take any items of property which have been identified
as belonging to Mr. Hansen and having come at some time

5
from that shed?
6
7
8

A

No. I had never seen the property until it was

taken out of the trailer by the police officers.
Q

Did you have further plans of your own that

9 I afternoon?
10
11

A

I did.

Q

What were they?

A

I had a job interview at 3:30 with West Valley

12
Transmissions.
13
14

Q

Were you able to keep that?

A

No.

15

MR. JONES:

Objection as to relevance.

16 I

THE COURT:

Sustained.

That will be

17 I stricken.
18
19
20

Q

(By Ms. Wells) Mr. Tucker, have you previously

been convicted of any criminal offenses?
A

Yes.

Q

And what was that offense and when?

A

In March of 1988 I was convicted of a forgery,

21
22
23

attempted forgery.

Attempted forgery, Class A misdemeanor.

Q

And that was a misdemeanor rather than a felony?

24 I

A

Yes.

25

Q

Would you please explain briefly the circumstances

I

surrounding that offense and your ultimate conviction?

,

Let me ask:

Did you enter a plea in that matter?

A

Yes.

Q

What were the circumstances surrounding that case?

A

My sister and I were sharing a house, and I was

3
4
5

putting my money into her bank account. We had a dispute

"

and I wanted my money out of her account.

7

account with my mother's name on the checks.

8
g

10

It's a joint

She wouldn't refund my money, my parents were on
vacation and I needed my money cause I was moving out of the
house.

And in order to get another house I needed my money.

So I forged my sister's signature to get my money.

11
12
13
H
15

Q

How much money was involved?

A

Less than $100.

Q

Again, did you enter a plea of guilty after being

charged with that offense?
A

Yes.

16 I

17

MS. WELLS: That's all the questions
I have.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

18

BY MR. JONES:

19
Q

20

Mr. Tucker, do you think you have a good recollec-

tion of the case for which you pled guilty to?

21

A

Do I —

22

Q

The attempted forgery that you just talked about

23

to the Jury?

24 I

A

Oh, yes.

2g |

Q

I s n ' t i t true that you s t o l e five checks from your

1 I mother?
2
3

A

Yes.

Q

And forged her name on those checks, didn't you?

A

Yes.

Q

One of the checks--the one you pled guilty to

4
5
6

was in excess of $500, wasn't it?
I

7

A

I think so.

Q

So you are not telling the Jury that you stole

8 J $100, are you?
9
10
11

A

No.

Q

How much, all totaled, did you steal from your

mother through those checks?
A

Number one, I didn't steal it.

It was my money.

Q

Well, you took checks, you stole blank checks

12
13

from your mother, didn't you?

14

A

I did.

15

Q

And you forged her signature on five of those?

16

A

I did.

17

Q

How much money did you take?

A

I would say around six hundred something.

Q

You are telling us that the one check was in

18
19

excess of $500 and the other four altogether only totaled
20
$100?
21
*2
23

A

There was a few that were not cashed.

one in my wallet that had never been cashed.
Q

Well, isn't it true that you had had these checks

24 I for some time?

25 I

There was

A

Yes

*

27
Q

How long had you had these checks?

A

Probably three days.

Q

You didn't have them more like three months?

A

I don't think so.

Q

Isn't it true that the reason that you took the

checks and cashed them was to support your drug habit?
A

No.
MS. WELLS: Your Honor, I would object--

I would ask the Court for a ruling and would like to approach
the Bench.
THE COURT:
objection.

I'm going to overrule the

The door has been opened as to the purpose for

the money on direct examination.
MS. WELLS:

I don' t believe that the

door was opened in that it wasn't asked of him for what
purpose.

He merely said it was his money. And I think what

this does is goes to a rule of evidence 404 problem.
THE COURT:

Do you need to proceed

MR. JONES:

I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Let's come to the side bar

further on this?

for just a moment.
(Bench conference off the record.)
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
Q

(By Mr. Jones) Mr. Tucker, is it your testimony

to the Jury that the only reason you took those five checks
is because you were entitled to the money?
A

Yes.

28

Q

Do you remember filling out a statement, kind

of a questionnaire or statement why you took that money?

A

To a certain degree, yes.

Q

Did you ever tell anyone in that statement that

the reason you took the money was to support a drug habit?

A

I can't remember.

Q

Were you on cocaine in April of 1988?

A

Had I used cocaine?

Q

Yes.

A

A few times, yes.

Q

Did you have a drug problem?

A

Not really a problem.

Q

Well, have you entered or been ordered to go

into a drug rehabilitation program?

A

I completed it, yes.

Q

Did you complete the program?

A

Yes.

Q

And when was that?

A

I was ordered in, I think, June of 1988, to go.

Q

Was it your testimony that you didn't have a

drug probl em at the time you entered that plea?

A

No.

Q

Excuse me, in April of 1988—

A

Yes, sir.

Q

--you had a drug problem at that time?

A

It was going to become a problem, yes.

Q

What about in March of 1989?

A

I have been clean for over a year.

I entered a plea of guilty.

29

Q

You were unemployed at the time of this incident?

A

Yes.

Q

And it's your testimony that you just happened

to be in the wrong place at the wrong time on March 29, 1989?

A

So to speak.

Q

You had no idea what your friend was up to?

A

Exactly.

Q

You weren't on drugs that day?

A

No.

Q

Is it true that the only person who was hiding

when the officers got there was yourself?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And your testimony is that Mr. Kanares is the one

who was ]responsible for this burglary and theft; is that right?

A

Yes.

Q

But he wasn't hiding, was he?

A

No, he was not.

Q

And the only reason you were hiding is because

you were afraid?

A

That, and I had a speeding ticket that had went

to a warrant, and I have done thirty days in jail on the
forgery, and I had no desire to go back to jail.
You weren't hiding, I guess, because of what

Q

happened over at Mr. Hansen's property?

A

No. At the time on the forgery I was beat up

real bad by the police, and again that same day.

Q

When did you know or realize that this property

was stolen?

34
Your Honor.

1
2

I

THE COURT: All right.

Before you

begin, Ms. Wells, members of the Jury, I want you to understand one thing, and that is that the testimony regarding
the incident of attempted forgery, a Class A misdemeanor
to which the defendant entered a plea, is to be considered
"

only for the purpose of determining Mr. Tucker's credibility

7

or his believability for that is the sole purpose that can

8

be used for.

9

Furthermore, anything beyond that mere fact that

10

relates to that incident of the plea concerning the forgery
or questions regarding what the purpose of Mr. Tucker's

11

conduct was in withdrawing money or writing checks on that
12
account on anything dealing with the purpose--I know you
13

heard some testimony in response to questions of Mr. Jones

14

about drugs, but that can only be used regarding the incident

15

and the purpose of the withdrawals of money and for no other

16

purpose.

17

J

MS. WELLS: Thank you, Your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

18

BY MS. WELLS:

19
Q

Mr. Tucker, the offense of attempted forgery,

20
did that involve your entering a plea through an agreement
21
22

where you admitted for purposes of the plea being taken that
the amount of money involved was less than $100?

23

A

Yes.

24 I

Q

All right.

25 | way to Mr. Jones?

Is that why you responded in that

1
2

I

A

Yes.

Q

You are not denying, however, that the total

amount of money that came from your mother's account was
3
more than $100?
4
5

A

Right.

Q

Now, with regard to Mr. Jones' question to you

"

concerning cocaine and any problem with it, in March of 1989,

7

just a month and a half ago, or two months ago, were you

8 | using cocaine?
9
10

A

No.

Q

On this particular day had you used any cocaine?

A

No.

Q

Did cocaine have anything to do with what was

11
12
going on there?
13
14

A

I no longer use cocaine or any form of drugs.

Q

Now, Mr. Jones has referred to, I think, Mr.

15 I Kanares as your friend.

How would you describe—prior to

16 I this--your relationship with him?
17
18

Did you consider him to

be a friend?
A

No.

Q

And how would you describe that relationship?

A

Just a person that I've performed work on his car

19
20
on a couple of occasions.
21

And I have met him at Becky's

house.

22

Q

Did you ever socialize with him?

23

A

No.

24

Q

Had you ever worked with him prior t o — I mean,

-,

have you and he ever been employed at the same place or done

37
II

A

Yes.

2

Q

And

^
4

ar

e you also telling the truth when you tell

them that the trunk was not open and there were no items
of property in the car at that time?
A

Yes.

Q

Were you present at West Valley or in West Valley

5
6
at the Kanares home when Mr. Hansen was brought back to the
7

area?

8

A

I was.

9 I

Q

And could you observe what he was shown with

10 J regard to the car?
11
12

A

Yes.

They had me in a police car in handcuffs.

Q

And what did you see Mr. Hansen shown?

A

Nothing was removed from the car.

He was walked

13
up to the car, and I could not see what he was shown there.
14
Q

To your knowledge, what was in the car at that

•^

A

At that point in time I did not know.

17

Q

Had Mr. Kanares put items back into the car then?

18 I

A

Yes, he had.

15

time?

MS. WELLS:

19
Tucker.

That's all I have, Mr.

Thank you.

20
RECROSS EXAMINATION
21
BY MR. JONES:
22
23

Q

One other question.

Do you remember when you

entered the guilty plea on the attempted forgery?

24 I

A

I do.

25

Q

Do you remember signing a document setting out

38
what you did?
A

Not exactly, no.

Q

Let me see if I can refresh your memory.

Do you

remember signing something that said that at the time you
cashed those checks your intent was to defraud someone else-MS. WELLS:

I111 object.

Thatfs beyond

the scope of cross-examination.
THE COURT:
Q

Sustained.

(By Mr. Jones) Are you still telling this Jury

that the only reason you took those checks was because
somebody owed you money?
A

Tucker.

Thatfs right.
MR. JONES:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

You may step down, Mr.

Thank you for your testimony.
MS. WELLS:

Your Honor, defense would

have no other witnesses to call, and at this time would rest.
THE COURT:

All right.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, can we have a
brief recess?
THE COURT

Yes.

MR. JONES

Ten minutes.

THE COURT

All right.

take a recess for about ten minutes.
of the Court:

How long do you need?

We are going to

Remember the admonition

Do not discuss this matter with anyone, includ-

ing among yourselves. Do not form or express any opinions or
conclusions, and if you can gather around the Jury room in
about ten minutes, we can start at that time. We are going

39
1

to remain here just a moment.

^

(Following proceedings continue in absence of Jury.)
THE COURT:
that the Jury has now departed.

The record should indicate
I have sets of Jury

instructions and verdict forms, one for Mr. Jones and one
for Mr. Tucker and one for Ms. Wells.

Somebody needs to

"

check the verdict forms.

7

tions is the result of my consideration of both sides

g

proposed Jury instructions and a short conference we had

g

after

10

This set of proposed Jury instruc-

we concluded yesterday, beginning at about 4:30, and

then further discussion this morning with counsel.
You need to check these and alert me to any

11
objections you may have that you did not previously inform
12
me of.
13
14

We will make formal objections on the record just

before I instruct the Jury.
One thing I would ask you to do, Ms. Wells, is

15 I take the Jury instructions relating to prior convictions and
15

I think a paragraph ought to be added to explain the circum-

yi

stances of going a bit beyond the incident itself, so that
it is very clear to the Jury-well, it should already be

18
clear from the instructions that they consider that only for
19
credibility.
20

And if you wish an elaboration on that, that

any of the other matters that were gone into on testimony

21

about that incident and the purpose for the money relates to

22

the credibility of Mr. Tucker in explaining that incident

23

and for that purpose only.

24
25

MS. WELLS:

I will prepare such an

addition to the instruction, Your Honor.

However, first, I

HKJ

1

indicated to the Court at the side bar during the first

2

break that I would like an opportunity to make a record
and to make a further motion.
THE COURT:

Right.

MS. WELLS: Your Honor, at this time
I would make a motion for a mistrial. The defendant made an
appropriate motion in limine prior to the beginning of the
7

trial, which was subsequently heard and ruled on by the Court.

8

Although the Court did not grant that motion, it

9 I was clearly, I believe, the order of the Court that such
10
11

admission by Mr.Tucker, should he testify, and of course under
the case law he is required to testify in order to get the
benefit of the motion and preserving it for appeal, and during

12
that testimony he admitted to the conviction for attempted
13

forgery, a Class A misdemeanor.

14
15

He was not requested on direct examination to make
any explanation beyond admission of the fact of the forgery

16 I itself, which constitutes the crime.

However, on cross-

17 J examination Mr. Jones elicited from him additional information
18
19

which I believe was elicited contrary to the ruling of the
Court, contrary to the spirit of the motion in limine, and
in violation of Rule 404, the Utah Rules of Evidence, parti-

20
cularly subsection B dealing with other crimes, wrongs, or
21
22

acts.
It indicates therein that evidence of other crimes,

23 wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
24 person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
25 It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as

41
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or a sense of mistake or accident.
There is no exception listed within 404B that
deals with the requirement that he explain one act by having
to then admit to some other wrong that could not otherwise
fit into Rule 404.
It was clearly the intent of the prosecution to
use that information to further inflame the Jury and indicate
to them that this was a person of bad character, more likely
to have engaged in criminal activity in March of 1989, than
not.
That is particularly true in light of the specific
reason for which he might be impeached upon testifying, which
is to cast doubt based upon that particular crime itself,
as to credibility.

The crime that he talked about paying

drug debts obviously deals with a different type of offense
that is not contemplated in the arguments made to the Court
or in the Court's ruling and its analysis under the Banner
test.

It was merely thrown in as an addition by counsel,

and it constitutes unfair prejudice and should warrant a
mistrial by the Court.
THE COURT: All right. I have had plenty
of time to think about this, and the record should reflect
that while not to this extent, the matters were discussed at
the side bar conference and a proffer at the time of the
objection was made, was noted, and it was not on the record
because it was at the side bar.

I overruled that objection,

and I am going to deny the motion for a new trial for the

I

following reasons:

Under normal circumstances the prosecution]

based on my ruling, has the right to have before the Jury
the fact of the conviction and what the conviction was for.
3
In this particular case, however, as a matter of strategy,
4

and appropriate strategy, the defendant through his counsel

5

sought to bring up the information before the prosecution

6

had an opportunity to. That is a strategic choice, and itfs

7

probably a good one. But in so doing it was not just a

g

statement of conviction and what the conviction was for.

g

There was furthermore testimony elicited by direct examina-

10

tion as to what the purpose was for the act underlying the
conviction in question.

11
Once that was done, the door was opened for the
12
13
14

prosecution to do more than it was otherwise entitled to do.
My memory of that testimony was that Mr. Tucker went into
the purposes for which he wrote bad checks. Once he did that,

15 I then the prosecution is entitled to ask questions on cross
16

to address the question of the purposes for the withdrawals

Yi

of money.

18

As far as Ifm concerned, that's all Mr. Jones did.
Furthermore, and for that reason, I don't think 404B is

19
pertinent because it was related not to additional wrongs or
20
21

act, but instead was related only to the conviction in
question, and in attempting to cross-examine Mr. Tucker on

22

the reasons for the withdrawals.

23

your 404B is not appropriate, so the motion is denied.

24
25

MS. WELLS:
thing, Your Honor?

For that reason I think

May I just indicate one more

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO._jJ>

The fact that the defendant has been convicted of a crime
may be considered by you for only one purpose, namely, in judging
the credibility of such testimony.

The fact of such a conviction

does

or

not

necessarily

credibility,

and

it

destroy

does

not

raise

impair

the

defendant's

a presumption

defendant or witness has testified falsely.

that the

It is simply one of

the circumstances that you are to take into consideration in
weighing the testimony of such a witness.
Any evidence of the circumstances or facts surrounding the
charge and conviction of the defendant for an offense other than
that for which he is currently on trial, including any reference
to why a previous crime was committed, cannot be considered by
you as evidence that the defendant is, by reason of those other
acts or circumstances, a person of bad character or more likely
to have committed this offense.

